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Abstract
In close elections, a sufficiently high share of invalid ballots - if driven by voter
mistakes or electoral fraud - can jeopardize the electoral outcome. We study how the
closeness of electoral race relates to the share of invalid ballots, under the traditional
paper-ballot hand-counted voting technology. Using a large micro-level dataset from
the Italian parliamentary elections in 1994-2001, we find a strong robust negative
relationship between the margin of victory of the leading candidate over the near-
est rival and the share of invalid ballots. We argue that this relationship is not
driven by voter mistakes, protest, or electoral fraud. The explanation that garners
most support is that of rational allocation of effort by election officers and party
representatives, with higher rates of detection of invalid ballots in close elections.
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“It’s not the voting that’s democracy, it’s the counting.” (Stoppard, 1972)
The heated debate in policy-making and academic circles following vote-counting prob-
lems at the 2000 U.S. Presidential elections (Ansolabehere and Stewart III, 2005, Caltech
and MIT Voting Technology Project, 2001, Card and Moretti, 2007, Knack and Kropf,
2003, Wand et al., 2001) indicates that the organization of ballot casting and counting
is a fundamental issue at the heart of democratic elections. During the last decades, nu-
merous countries (including the United States, Brazil, Estonia, France, and Switzerland)
carried out important policy changes regarding how voting process and vote counting is
organized. Under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), for instance, the United States
invested around 3 billion USD into improving and replacing voting technologies (Stew-
art III, 2011), replacing punchcard- and lever-based systems with electronic voting ma-
chines. Contrarily, the Netherlands chose to abolish electronic voting technologies and
to move back to paper ballots, following the technical problems with voting machines in
2006 and the subsequent public debate (Jacobs and Pieters, 2009).
In general, in the majority of large elections, there is a relatively small fraction of
votes that is counted as invalid. When electoral race is tight, even a small number of
votes can make a difference for the electoral outcome, and thus the importance of invalid
ballots increases disproportionately. Intuitively, if the share of invalid ballots is sufficiently
high as compared to the margin of victory of the winning candidate, and if the presence
of invalid ballots is driven by voter mistakes or electoral fraud, then such ballots might
seriously undermine the correct functioning of the electoral system.
The validity of this common-sense intuition crucially depends on the origin of invalid
ballots and the relationship between the share of invalid ballots and electoral competition.
In this paper, we study how the closeness of electoral race relates to the share of invalid
ballots under the traditional paper-ballot hand-counted voting technology. We rely on a
large micro-level dataset from the Italian parliamentary elections in 1994-2001 (the period
during which three-quarters of the lower chamber of the Italian Parliament was elected
using first-past-the-post system). Italian elections in this period present a natural setting
for studying the above question, both because of the specific details of the organization of
ballot counting (as explained below) and the availability of highly disaggregated electoral
data containing rich variation in political behavior and socioeconomic variables, which
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allows for testing between alternative theoretical explanations.
We document a strong robust negative correlation between the margin of victory of
the leading candidate over the nearest rival and the share of invalid ballots. We then in-
vestigate the possible theoretical explanations for this relationship and argue, on the basis
of econometric evidence, that this relationship is unlikely to be driven by voter mistakes,
protest, or electoral fraud. The explanation that garners most support is that election of-
ficers and party representatives rationally allocate more effort in detecting invalid ballots
when the stakes are highest, i.e. when the electoral race is closer. In other words, the
relationship that we document corresponds to higher rates of detection of invalid ballots
in closer elections.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that documents and analyzes the
relation between electoral competition and invalid ballots. Numerous papers in economics
and political science (e.g. Ansolabehere and Stewart III, 2005, Card and Moretti, 2007,
Dee, 2007, Fujiwara, 2015, Shue and Luttmer, 2009) have studied the electoral outcomes,
including the number of invalid or residual votes, under different voting technologies.1
However, what matters for electoral outcomes is not so much the average level of ballots
counted as invalid under different technologies, but whether the number of (truly) invalid
ballots increases or decreases when the electoral race becomes tighter. Having a substan-
tial fraction of invalid ballots or misvotes in a landslide election clearly matters less (as
noted by Dee (2007) and Shue and Luttmer (2009) for the California recall election in
2003) than a much smaller fraction of invalid ballots in a close election (as, for instance,
in the case of misvotes in Palm Beach County, Florida, during the 2000 Presidential
election). This issue is exactly the focus of our paper.
Another related strand of literature studies vote buying and ballot rigging (see the
collection of papers in Schaffer 2007 and Lehoucq 2003 for a good survey). In a study
of Chilean elections before 1965, Baland and Robinson (2008) find that the introduction
of the secret ballot in 1958 had effectively destroyed the “market” for votes that existed
between landed aristocracy (which controlled the votes of its agricultural workers) and the
right-wing parties, thus sharply decreasing the votes for the right-wing parties. Lehoucq
and Molina (2002) study the accusation of ballot-rigging filed in Costa Rica, and find
that such accusations where substantially more numerous in close-race districts. This
1See Stewart III (2011) for an excellent survey.
3
finding does not, however, imply that fraud is more frequent in close-race districts: it
might as well be that, holding the number of rigged ballots constant, the higher incen-
tives for parties to file an accusation of ballot-rigging were stronger in close-race districts.
Thus, understanding whether the correlation between the fraction of invalid ballots and
the closeness of electoral race is driven by fraud is a key question. The additional con-
tribution of this paper lies in providing an answer to this query, using the case of Italian
parliamentary elections.
1 Invalid Ballots: What Are They?
In any election based on a paper ballot system, all ballots cast by voters belong to one of
the three categories: valid, blank (the voter did not express any preference), or invalid (the
election officers consider that the voter did not express her preference correctly). Under
the traditional hand-counted paper ballot system, after the vote count is completed, the
election administration reports the number of ballots belonging to each category. A ballot
can be considered invalid for different reasons: for instance, the voter over-votes (i.e. casts
more than one preference when only one preference is allowed) or takes an action that
undermines the secrecy of the vote (e.g. signs the ballot). The duty of an election officer
is to invalidate any ballot on which the voter does not uniquely and anonymously identify
her preference. These rules apply to most, if not all, democratic elections using the paper-
ballot system. The stated objective of this procedure is to avoid antidemocratic and illegal
voting behavior.
The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, which maintains a database on
parliamentary and presidential elections across most countries in the world, reports the
share of invalid votes for about 100 countries over the last 10 years. The average share of
invalid ballots is around 3 percent. However, looking across countries (see Figure 1), one
sees a large variation in this measure. In all the developed countries the share of invalid
ballots is a single-digit number, typically below 5 percent. The number is much higher
for the developing countries, with double-digit numbers in several developing countries,
in particular in Latin America and Western Africa.
Political scientists have tried to link the variation in the share of invalid ballots to
some principal characteristics of the political system. Power and Garand (2007) analyze,
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using an aggregate-level panel-data analysis from 80 legislative elections held in 18 Latin
American democracies between 1980 and 2000, the influence of three sets of factors on the
number of invalid ballots: socio-demographic (literacy, education, wealth), institutional
(electoral system and ballot structure), and political (alienation and protest). They find
some support for all the three sets of factors: socioeconomic factors (urbanization and
income inequality) correlate with the number of invalid votes, institutional factors (com-
pulsory voting, electoral disproportionality, and the combination of high district magni-
tude with personalized voting) increase the number of blank and spoiled ballots, whereas
political factors such as political violence and the level and direction of democratic change
also correlate with the share of invalid votes. Uggla (2008) also conducts an aggregate
study by looking at over 200 elections in Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and
the Americas in the 1980-2000 period. He finds support for the hypothesis that the vari-
ation in the share of invalid ballots reflect the voters’ reaction to the perceived absence
of political choice.
The key problem with these aggregate studies is that one cannot rule out the influence
of some unobserved factors (e.g. political culture) that influences simultaneously the
number of invalid ballots and the institutional factors. We are able to overcome this
problem by using highly disaggregated data from a setting with homogeneous formal
political institutions, but with a sufficiently large variation (both across time and space)
in political behavior.2
2 Context and Data
2.1 Organization of Italian Parliamentary Elections
In this section, we describe the political and institutional context from which our data
comes. We analyze electoral data from the three Italian parliamentary elections (1994,
1996, and 2001), during which three-quarters of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower
chamber) was elected through the first-past-the-post majoritarian system, in 475 uni-
2Two other papers (McAllister and Makkai, 1993, Power and Roberts, 1995) study within-country
variation in invalid ballots (in Australia and Brazil, respectively). Only the former paper documents
some relationship between the closeness of electoral race and the share of invalid ballots, which the
authors of the study attribute to the differences in the socio-economic composition of close-race versus
safe districts in Australia. Neither study attempts to distinguish between alternative explanations for
the relationship between electoral competition and invalid ballots.
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nominal electoral districts (explained in detail below). We restrict our dataset to this
period because these elections exhibit a natural measure of the closeness of the electoral
competition: the margin of victory between the candidates with the highest and the
second-highest number of votes.
Our dataset has several advantages over similar data from other settings. First, our
data is highly disaggregated: the unit of observation is a municipality (for the electoral
districts that contain more than one municipality) or an electoral district (for large mu-
nicipalities that contain more than one district); this substantially increases the power of
statistical analysis. Second, it counts separately blank ballots and invalid ballots. This is
important because under the traditional paper-ballot voting, a blank ballot clearly indi-
cates intentional abstention by the voter, whereas in settings that use other technologies
(such as, for instance, in most elections in the United States), it is difficult to separate
clearly a voter’s intention from the malfunctioning of the voting technology, in case of an
empty ballot (see Ansolabehere and Stewart III, 2005). In such settings, the election data
usually lumps together blank and invalid ballots into the category of “residual votes.”
Third, in Italian elections, invalid ballots represent a relatively small but non-negligible
fraction of total votes. However, the quality of democratic institutions and voter literacy
are high, and therefore it is unlikely that the majority of invalid ballots are driven by
protest or voter mistakes (as, for instance, in several Latin American countries). Finally,
while the electoral system is uniform throughout the country, there is rich geographic
variation in the measures of electoral behavior and outcomes, both across large (regions
and provinces) and small (municipalities and within-city electoral districts) administrative
units.
For three legislatures - that started in 1994, 1996, and 2001 - Italian citizens elected
their representatives using a two-tier system (75 percent of representatives via the majori-
tarian system and the remaining 25 percent via the proportional-representation system).
Before 1994 and after 2001 the entire Italian electoral system was based on proportional
representation.
On the election day, each voter received two ballots: one to cast a vote for a can-
didate in her single-member district, and another to cast a vote for a party list in her
larger proportional district. Figure 2 shows a typical ballot, for the majoritarian and
proportional-representation systems in Italy. In the districts with the majoritarian sys-
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tem, the voter has to put a cross on the name of the candidate of her preference, whereas
in the districts under the PR system, she has to put a cross on the party/coalition symbol.
475 out of the 630 House members were elected in single-member majoritarian-election
districts, while the rest was elected from closed party lists in 26 multiple-member districts
(with 2 to 12 seats per district). In our analysis, we focus on these 475 majoritarian-
election single-member districts.
The polling stations during the elections operated in the following way. Parliamentary
elections in Italy take place on a Sunday between 8 AM and 10 PM, and on the following
Monday between 7 AM and 3 PM. As soon as the elections end (i.e. on Monday afternoon),
election officers start counting the ballots. The counts typically last uninterrupted until
late Monday night or, sometimes, up to Tuesday morning.
Each polling station has three types of election officers: the president of the polling
station, a secretary, and three canvassers. Party list representatives (at most two indi-
viduals for each party list) can also assist the vote count at the polling station. At least
three election officers, including the president or the vice-president (chosen by the presi-
dent among the canvassers), have to be present through the entire count. The president
of the polling station decides, after consulting with the canvassers, on the outcome of any
disputes related to the vote count, including those about the validity of any particular
ballot. She then registers her provisional decision (while the Parliament has the last word
about official protests). The secretary keeps the official record about all the activities
during the count. At the end of the counting all members of the polling stations sign the
official record. Both the election officers and party list representatives can contest ballots,
i.e. question the decision about the validity of any given vote.
Each election officer receives a monetary compensation of about 100 euros for her work
at the polling station. In addition, both the election officers and party representatives are
compensated by their employers with (at most) 3 days of paid leave.
Each ballot is scrutinized by all the canvassers, the president, and - if present - by party
representatives. The number of valid votes for each candidate is marked (typically on a
board) and gets regularly updated as the count proceeds. This implies that people present
at the count can observe the evolution of the number of votes for each candidate and have
a perception of the margin (at their polling station) between the leading candidate and
the nearest rival.
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Given that voters are instructed to put just one sign (“x”) on the ballot (and no other
mark is allowed), detection of any visible irregularity on the ballot (e.g. more than one
preference expressed, a signature, an additional mark made by mistake, etc.) implies
that the president declares the ballot as invalid. However, given the large number of
ballots that have to be scrutinized and the fact that often the count continues late into
the Monday night, guaranteeing that each ballot containing an irregularity gets detected
is difficult.
According to the Electoral Law, the president is a public official and has the authority
to arrest those who disturb the voting process, including the party representatives and
the other canvassers. The president, the secretary, and the canvassers are all obliged to
denounce any criminal act related to the voting and the vote counting. If the president
is involved in such acts, the secretary and the canvassers are supposed to contact the
judicial authorities. Public officials who deliberately alter the ballots or the final counting
face the risk of being punished with up to 8 years of jail.
2.2 Data
We extracted the information on three majoritarian parliamentary elections from the
Historical Electoral Atlas of Italy (Corbetta and Piretti, 2008). An observation in our
dataset represents the smallest level of aggregation of polling stations available, that is
the smallest unit between a municipality and a district (hereafter, we refer to this as
‘the electoral unit’). Larger cities have several districts: for instance, the municipality of
Rome has 24 and the municipality of Milan has 11. These cities are rather exceptional
and represent only 1.4 percent of our observations. We can thus think of an electoral unit
in our dataset as a municipality.
Next, we matched each municipality to its (province-level) total crime rate, corruption
crime rate, organized crime rate, and the share of city councils in the province that were
dissolved for Mafia infiltration.3
Finally, we complemented the municipality-level data with province-level measures of
education, turnout at national referenda, labor activity rate, unemployment rate, GDP
3These data are only available for the years 2004 to 2009. Since the variation across municipalities
explains 86 percent of the total variation in crime rate, we use the average crime rates across all years as
a measure of crime rate for the three election years 1994, 1996, and 2001.
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per capita, and the rate of urbanization.
Each polling station is responsible for 500 to 1,200 eligible voters, though there can
be exceptions to this rule for isolated areas that are difficult to reach. While in general
we do not know whether an electoral unit corresponds to a polling station, electoral units
with an electorate size smaller than 1,200 (which represent 32 percent of electoral units)
are likely to be single polling stations, because of the rule noted above. We perform most
of our analysis using all the electoral units (so as to avoid any selection bias coming from
the size of the electorate). However, we also present results of the analyses that uses only
the electoral units that are likely to be single polling stations (i.e. municipalities with less
than 1,200 voters).
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the key variables used in our empirical
analysis. Overall, our dataset contains 8,224 electoral units for the three election years,
which gives a (slightly unbalanced) panel of 23,109 observations. Our main variable of
interest, i.e. ballots reported as invalid, represent a non-negligible fraction of votes. On
average, in a typical district or municipality, 3.9 percent of all the ballots is reported
as invalid. We also see that there is substantial variation in this measure: the standard
deviation is 2.2 percent. A slightly higher fraction of ballots (4.6 percent) is cast as blank.
Turnout rate is relatively high (which is a traditional characteristic of Italian elections): in
a typical district, 82 percent of all eligible voters participate. The average leading margin
(i.e. the difference in the share of votes between the candidate with the highest number
of votes and the nearest rival) is substantial; at the electoral unit level it is 18.4 percent;
however, the variation is large (the standard deviation is 14.8 percentage points). The
electoral unit with the smallest leading margin in our dataset exhibits a vote difference
of zero percent, whereas in the one with the largest margin, the first candidate leads by
96.1 percent.4
The main two party coalitions (center-left and center-right) lead the electoral compe-
tition in most electoral units. The center-left coalition leads in 36.2 percent of electoral
units, whereas the center-right coalition leads in 38 percent of cases. We observe a strong
party incumbency effect: in 94.4 per cent of cases, the candidate from the incumbent
4Ideally, we would like to conduct our analysis using the measures of ex-ante or expected margins of
victory. Unfortunately, such measures are not available. Nevertheless, the measures of ex-post or realized
margins of victory are good proxies of ex-ante margins, under the assumption that relevant political
actors (voters, election officers, party representatives, etc.) hold rational expectations.
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coalition is the one with the highest number of votes. The incumbent politician effect is,
however, much smaller: in 46.5 percent of cases, the voting ballot contains the name of
the incumbent politician, and in slightly more than half of these cases (or in 26.4 percent
of the total), the incumbent politician leads. The number of candidates also varies across
districts. On average, a voter is confronted with a ballot containing 4.14 candidates.
Figure 3 indicates that the share of invalid ballots varies substantially across different
regions and provinces. Southern regions exhibit the highest levels of invalid ballots, fol-
lowed by the North-West. The Northern and Central regions exhibit the lowest levels of
invalid ballots. While North-South divide is large, there is also substantial within-region
(province-level) variation, both in the North and the South of Italy.
To match our data against the hypothesis of invalid ballots being driven by electoral
fraud, we will also use measures of the rates of prevalence of different types of crime.
Figure 4 shows the crime patterns across Italian provinces. Interestingly, it indicates that
there no clear North-South divide in crime rates. The corruption-related and organized
crime is more common in the Southern and North-Western provinces. Another measure
of Mafia infiltration in public offices is the share of city councils dissolved: these are
essentially concentrated in Sicily, Calabria, and Campania regions. Finally, the total
crime rate (most likely being driven by economic crimes) is higher in the North and the
Center-South of Italy.
3 Invalid Ballots and Electoral Competition
The left panel of Figure 5 presents graphically the relationship between the leading margin
(the difference in the share of votes between the candidate with the highest number of
votes and the nearest rival) and the fraction of ballots reported as invalid (out of the total
number of ballots). Each dot represents the fraction of invalid ballots for a given percentile
of the margin of victory. For the levels of leading margin that are close to zero, invalid
ballots represent almost 4.5 percent of all votes, whereas to the largest percentiles of the
leading margin correspond the lowest fractions of invalid ballots (around 2.5 percent).
Overall, there is a clear negative correlation between the two variables: the larger is the
leading margin, the smaller is the fraction of invalid ballots. This is also confirmed in
column 1 of Table 2: the regression coefficient on the leading margin is negative and highly
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statistically significant.5 The effect is quantitatively important: one standard deviation
increase in the leading margin (14.8 percentage points) corresponds to a reduction in the
fraction of invalid ballots of about one-sixth of a standard deviation (0.35 percent of total
votes). Restricting the analysis to the 2,704 electoral units with less than 1,200 eligible
voters leads to very similar results (see the right panel of Figure 5 and Table 3).
4 Competing Explanations
What are the possible explanations for the empirical relationship that we have established
above? Although direct tests of theories of political behavior that aim at explaining this
pattern are not feasible (because they would require obtaining measures of individual
behavior such as, for instance, the attention of voters, the effort of election officers and
party representatives, etc.), we can rely on indirect tests that allow us to rule out some
theories in favor of others.
The prime suspect is the behavior of voters. Consider a simple cost-benefit calculation
of an individual voter. Suppose that filling out the ballot requires concentration, and filling
it out correctly implies some attention cost. Moreover, suppose that the probability
of making a mistake (and, therefore, submitting an invalid ballot) decreases with the
attention allocated by the voter. On the benefit side, if the voter prefers one candidate
over the other, she might perceive a benefit from feeling that her vote helped to increase
the chances of victory of her preferred candidate. This might be justified by either the
fact that a voter considers her probability of being pivotal (see Ch. 14 in Mueller 2003),
or - more realistically - by the fact that the voter might feel the moral duty to “do her
part” in helping her preferred party to win (as in the models by Feddersen and Sandroni
2006a,b).
The higher is the expected margin of victory of one of the candidates in the district,
the lower is the voter’s expected benefit of casting a valid vote. Given that the margin of
victory does not affect the cost side, the higher is the margin, the lower is the attention
that the voter devotes to casting a valid vote, and thus the higher is the probability of
submitting an invalid ballot.
5This result is robust to using the logarithms of the variables instead of their levels on one or both
sides of the regression equation.
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Under this simple opportunity-cost theory of voter behavior, we would obtain a pre-
diction that a higher margin of victory should be positively correlated with the fraction
of invalid ballots. However, as we have seen above, the relationship is negative. Thus,
this correlation cannot be explained by voters’ attention.
Another explanation is based on voter protest. Voters might have (negative) feel-
ings about the (lack of) choice that they are facing, and may act in the voting booth
in reaction to these feelings. For instance, Brighenti (2003) analyzes a selection of in-
valid ballots in a regional election in Italy, and finds that a part of the invalid ballots
report emotionally-charged (typically, negative) messages written by voters on their bal-
lots. These are examples of voluntary invalidation.
If the expected margin of victory is sufficiently large, some of the voters that support
the losing candidate might feel that their electoral choice is unfairly constrained. If this
triggers negative emotions in them, some of the voters might voluntarily invalidate their
ballots. A related possibility is that of expressive voting (Brennan and Lomasky, 1993,
Schuessler, 2000). If voters want to express their general discontent about the political
system, they might want to cast an invalid ballot as a protest. At the same time, each
voter might have a political preference for some party. The closer is the electoral race,
the higher is the opportunity cost of invalidating the ballot to express one’s discontent.
Under this theory as well, we should observe a positive correlation between the margin of
victory and the fraction of invalid ballots (which goes against what we find in the data).
We can further refine our analysis, if we consider that ballot invalidation is not the
only way of expressing one’s protest. Some of the voters might express their feelings by
leaving their ballots blank. Then, the fraction of invalid ballots and that of blank ballots
should be correlated. Based on this intuition, we can use the fraction of blank ballots as
a regressor, so as to capture, at least in part, the voters’ protest.
Our empirical results show that this explanation based on voter protest does not
fit the data. First, in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 and of Table 3, the coefficient on the
leading margin is negative (which is the opposite to the prediction of this theory). Second,
while blank ballots correlate positively with the fraction of invalid ballots, even when we
include the blank ballots and the number of candidates in the regression (in column 2 of
both tables), the negative coefficient on the leading margin remains highly statistically
significant.
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In column 3, we verify how robust our main finding is to the inclusion of a series of
local (province-level) characteristics that can affect the benefits and costs for voters of
casting valid ballots. These characteristics include the level of education (measured by
the fractions of the population with university and high-school degrees), social capital
(measured by the average turnout at national referenda), income (measured by the labor
activity rate, the unemployment rate, and GDP per capita), crime (the incidence of
corruption, of organized crime, and total crime cases per 100 inhabitants), as well as
the rate of urbanization. While some of these variables capture a part of the variation in
invalid ballots, the coefficient on the leading margin remains highly significant. In column
4, we perform an even more stringent test, by adding year- and electoral-unit fixed effects.
This means that the remaining variation in the share of invalid ballots is within the same
electoral unit across the three elections. The coefficient on the leading margin remains
basically unchanged (both in terms of size and significance). In other words, if the leading
margin increases from one election to the other within the same electoral unit, the fraction
of invalid ballots reported at this unit significantly decreases. Given that the coefficient
on leading margin is unchanged while the R-squared increases to about 70 percent there
is fairly little scope for unobservable characteristics to explain our results (Altonji et al.,
2005, see).
Another possibility is that closer races lead to an increase in voter turnout. If the
marginal voters are less educated and more prone to invalidate the ballot the effect that
we observe could be driven by voter selection. While all the regressions control for the
linear term of turnout, the selection might easily generate non-linear effects. To control
for selection in Column 1 of Table 4 we add the cubic term in turnout and in Column 2
we interact the cubic term with the fraction of the population with high school and with a
university degree. The coefficients on the leading margin are almost unchanged (whereas
if the voter selection was the only driver behind our observed effect, we would expect
the coefficients on leading margin in Columns 1 and 2 to go to zero). Columns 3 and 4
show that while the margin of victory effects are larger in the South they also present
in the North. We see this as indirect evidence that fraud, which is more widespread in
the South, is unlikely to be the major driver, though later we are going to devise more
stringent tests.
If the explanation for the negative correlation that we observe does not come from
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voter behavior, it plausibly comes from the behavior of those who count the votes, i.e.
election officers. Let’s suppose that election officers act rationally. Given that they are
called to act as public officials to ensure that all the ballots cast are counted correctly
(which, in particular, includes detecting ballots that are cast incorrectly), we can formalize
the problem of an election officer as follows.
Suppose that each officer considers all the ballots that have to be counted, one by
one. Each ballot that she scrutinizes can be either valid or invalid. The objective of the
election officer is to minimize the likelihood that the victory is incorrectly adjudicated to
the candidate that, in reality, has fewer valid ballots in her favor. However, the officers
might make mistakes. There are two types of error that the officer might commit. Type
I error consists in invalidating a truly valid ballot. Type II error consists in counting as
valid a ballot which is in reality invalid. Given that the type I error is very unlikely to
happen (it is virtually impossible to detect a non-existent irregularity in a ballot which
has been correctly filled out by the voter), we can assume such errors away. Instead, the
type II error - missing an existing irregularity - is much more important. Moreover, the
likelihood of this error is affected by the effort that the officer exerts. These type-II errors
might jeopardize the true outcome of the elections if they are sufficiently numerous as
compared to the difference in the number of valid votes between the two candidates.6
In other words, the officer exerts the effort of attention to minimize the number of
type-II errors. However, the effort is costly, and the higher is the number of ballots
to scrutinize, the higher is the marginal cost of effort. On the other hand, the risk of
jeopardizing the election outcome depends on the expected margin of victory: the larger
is this margin, the less it is likely that a given number of type-II errors influence the
election outcome.
The rational officer chooses the level of effort that equates the marginal cost of effort to
its marginal benefit. If the expected margin of victory increases, the benefit of effort falls,
and thus the officer puts lower effort. This, in turn, implies a lower number of truly invalid
ballots that are counted as invalid. Thus, this theory can explain the negative correlation
between the margin of victory and the fraction of invalid ballots: election officers rationally
6This implicitly assumes that the election officer acts taking into account the worst-case scenario: that,
if let pass, all the invalid ballots are counted as votes for the same candidate. While this assumption is
unrealistic in its pure form, our reasoning remains valid as far as the election officer considers as possible
a scenario sufficiently close to the worst case.
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allocate effort, depending on the (expected) closeness of elections, which implies higher
rates of detection of invalid ballots in relatively closer races.
Let’s now consider the effect of a variation in turnout. Given that the number of
election officers is fixed (i.e. it is not adjusted on the basis of turnout), a higher number
of voters showing up at the polls implies a higher number of ballots that each officer has
to scrutinize. This means (under the standard convexity assumption on the cost function)
that the incremental cost of effort increases. The officer then finds it optimal to reduce
the effort that she puts in scrutinizing each individual ballot, which, in turn, leads to a
lower fraction of invalid ballots. Moreover, this effort-reducing effect is stronger when the
electoral competition is weaker. Thus, we should observe that the negative correlation
between invalid ballots and margin of victory is stronger for higher-turnout electoral units.
Columns 5 to 7 of Table 4 report the estimates with this interaction term included in
the regression. Consistent with the above hypothesis, we indeed find that the coefficient
on the interaction between turnout and leading margin is negative and highly statistically
significant (for the whole sample and for Southern Italy).
The explanations above disregard the role of political parties. However, as we discussed
in the previous section, party representatives can attend the vote count, and it is highly
plausible that parties act strategically in this respect and try to actively use their resources
to influence the intensity of vote counting, depending on the incentives. In particular,
if the total number of representatives that each party can allocate to any given election
is limited (parties either have to pay the representatives to do this job, or to mobilize
volunteers), parties are likely to allocate their representatives in units that give them the
highest expected return.
The institutional organization of the electoral system allows us to obtain a set of
additional predictions. For candidates, what matters for each party is not winning the
race at each municipality, but obtaining the highest number of votes at the district level.
However, the closeness of electoral race at the district level does not necessarily coincide
with that in each electoral unit within that district. Election officers do not have access
to information about the evolution of the vote count in other units (and thus at the
district level). It is plausible that they use the tightness of the race in their own units
as the best predictors of the electoral competition at the district level. Parties, however,
have a clear informational advantage in this respect. Obviously, allocating representatives
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(even in locally competitive races) in districts that are won or lost almost for sure (i.e.
those with wide expected margins of victory at the district level) makes little strategic
sense. Therefore, parties allocate disproportionately more representatives - in both lo-
cally competitive and non-competitive units - into the districts where the (district-level)
competition is stronger, and where even a few votes counted mistakenly might imply win-
ning or losing the parliamentary seat. Then, in a two-party election, if both parties act
similarly, we should expect that ballots are scrutinized much more closely in the districts
with lower district-level victory margins. This would imply a higher fraction of ballots
invalidated in such districts, and this should occur independently of the closeness of the
electoral race at the unit level.
We explore the role of parties in Table 5. In Column 1 we add as regressors the
leading margin at the district level, as well as the dummies for the identity of the leading
coalition. We see that the coefficient on the leading margin at the unit level remains
highly statistically significant. However, when the leading coalition is the center-right
one, the fraction of invalid ballots is significantly smaller. This could be because center-
right coalition has more resources to devote to observing the vote counts (note that
the specification includes electoral-unit fixed effects; therefore, the remaining variation is
within units, so this right-wing effect cannot be driven by fixed characteristic of voters at
the unit level).
Column 2 includes the measure of electoral competition at both the unit and the
district levels, as well as the interaction term between the two leading margins. The
coefficient on the interaction term is negative and highly statistically significant. What
does this mean? Figure 6 resumes this finding in the graphical form. Let’s define the
electoral race to be competitive at the district level when the margin of victory is below
the overall median margin of victory (calculated across all districts and elections). We can
see that the slope of the relationship between the share of invalid ballots and the (unit-
level) leading margin is very different in competitive versus non-competitive parliamentary
districts. In particular, in the non-competitive districts, larger leading margin at the
electoral unit level implies smaller fraction of the invalid ballots. This is consistent with
the explanation of the rational allocation of detection effort by election officers, who do not
observe what happens in other units and thus consider their own units as representative
of the district-level race. Contrarily, in competitive districts, larger leading margins at
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the electoral unit level imply virtually no reduction in the share of invalid ballots. This
is likely to be because of the attention that party representatives devote to all (or most)
electoral units in such districts, regardless of the intensity of competition locally. Given
that the race is very close at the district level, party representatives keep putting pressure
on election officers so that these latter detect all the invalid ballots possible, even in units
with large local margins.
In the above discussion, we have implicitly assumed that election officers are motivated
by duty. A plausible alternative is that they have preferences over candidates or parties,
and - given the difficulty to monitor their behavior during the count - try to help their
preferred candidates or parties to win by invalidating some of the valid ballots that are in
favor of their less-preferred candidates. Researchers in political science have been aware
of this possibility for a long time (Harris (1934)).
Given that electoral fraud is an illegal activity, it implies the risk of punishment if the
illegal action of the election officer is discovered. Unless the three canvassers, the secretary,
the president, as well as the party representatives that are present in the polling station
agree to forge the ballot count, the decision problem of a law-breaking officer can be
described as follows. Each incremental valid ballot that the officer invalidates increases
the risk of getting caught. Moreover, it is plausible to assume that this risk increases
more than proportionally with each additional ballot. If the officer invalidates just a few
valid ballots, the likelihood that the authorities discover this misbehavior are very low.
However, if she invalidates a few more ballots, this likelihoods starts to increase relatively
quickly, as - for instance - the discrepancy of the election outcomes with exit polls starts
to increase.
On the benefit side, the biased officer wanting to increase the likelihood that her pre-
ferred party wins the election understands that this likelihood is large when the expected
margin of victory of one candidate over the other is slim. Contrarily, when the expected
margin of victory is wide (either in favor of her preferred candidate or against), addi-
tional invalidated ballots contribute negligibly to increasing this likelihood. There are
two possible theoretical cases. One is that the risk of getting caught for invalidation does
not depend on the expected margin of victory. Then, clearly, a wider expected margin of
victory implies lower number of invalidations by a rational biased officer. In such case,
one obtains the prediction that higher margin of victory should be negatively correlated
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with the fraction of invalid ballots, just like under the explanation based on duty-driven
election officers that we have described above.
Alternatively, the other - non-biased - actors (other election officers and party rep-
resentatives) allocate attention not only to counting ballots but also to monitoring their
colleagues. In such case, they would rationally allocate more attention to monitoring
when the expected margin of victory is small, taking into account that the incentives to
misbehave of biased officers are then higher. Such rational behavior would (negatively)
link the probability of capture of misbehaving officers to the expected margin of victory.
If this link is sufficiently strong, then theoretically it is possible that a biased officer would
actually invalidate at the same rate when the expected margin of victory is small and when
it is large (because his marginal costs and benefits rise at the same rate when the margin
of victory increases). This second case fails to generate a prediction that corresponds to
the empirical patterns that we have documented above.
Suppose, however, that the first of the two cases described above is true. In other
words, the theory of rational duty-oriented election officer and that of a biased officer
generate the same main prediction concerning the correlation between the expected mar-
gin of victory and the reported share of invalid ballots. Then, how can one discern
empirically between these two alternative explanations? If the electoral fraud is an im-
portant driver of the variation in invalid ballots, then - under an auxiliary assumption
that the extent of electoral fraud is correlated with other measures of crime - we should
normally observe a stronger effect of electoral competition on invalid ballots in areas with
higher rates of crime. Here we can exploit the large variation in different measures of
crime across Italian provinces: while there are some regions that have, on average, sub-
stantially higher crime rates than others, there is still a lot of within-region variation in
crime. We report in Table 6 the results of the estimations in which we add as regressors
different measures of crime (at province level), as well as the interaction terms between
crime rates (standardized for the ease of comparison across columns) and the margin
of victory. If the electoral-fraud mechanism is empirically important, we should find a
significant negative coefficient on the interaction term. However, in neither of the three
specifications (in which crime is measured with the rate of corruption, organized-crime
rate, and the share of city councils dissolved for Mafia infiltration) the coefficient on the
interaction term is statistically different from zero. We can see this clearly also on Figure
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7, in which we plot the relationship between electoral competition and invalid ballots in
high-crime versus low-crime areas. Independently of how we measure the crime rates, the
slopes of the relationship between electoral competition and invalid ballots in two types
of provinces are very similar. This implies that there is no evidence that electoral fraud
explains the empirical relationship that we have established earlier.
5 Conclusion
Invalid ballots have been considered a problem for democratic elections, as they might
jeopardize the electoral outcome when the electoral race is close. Our paper challenges
this view. Using a detailed micro-level dataset from the Italian parliamentary elections
in 1994-2001 (which use the traditional paper-ballot hand-counted voting technology), we
find a strong robust negative correlation between the margin of victory of the leading
candidate over the nearest rival and the share of invalid ballots. We then show that this
relationship is unlikely to be driven by voter mistakes, protest, or electoral fraud. The
explanation that garners most support is that election officers and party representatives
rationally allocate more effort in detecting invalid ballots when the stakes are higher, i.e.
when the electoral race in the district is closer. In other words, under hand-counted voting
technology, in closer elections there are higher rates of detection of invalid ballots.
What are the implications of our findings for the current debates on voting technolo-
gies? Our analysis shows that the traditional paper-based hand-counted ballot system
seems to have a correction mechanism that adjusts the likelihood that the winner is an-
nounced correctly to the closeness of electoral race. This mechanism functions thanks
to the increased attention that the election officers and parties allocate to making sure
that invalid ballots are not counted as valid ones when the electoral race becomes closer.
Now, suppose a government considers whether to abandon the paper-ballot system in
parliamentary elections in favor of an electronic voting (DRE) system that does not have
paper trail (which makes it impossible to recount the votes in case of need). Plausibly,
such a government has several considerations in its social-welfare function: (i) minimiz-
ing the risk that the winner in each district is identified/announced incorrectly, (ii) the
economic cost (including the time cost of delay in announcing the election outcomes),
and (iii) maximizing the correct aggregation of voter preferences. The electronic voting
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system is not error-free (see, for instance, (Stewart III, 2011) for a detailed discussion);
moreover, it is unlikely that the likelihood of machine failure under this system is cor-
related with the expected margin of victory. On the other hand, the DRE system can
present some cost advantage over the paper-ballot system (especially in terms of rapid
announcement of election results). Finally, in terms of the aggregation of voter prefer-
ences, (Fujiwara, 2015) shows that in an electorate with relatively low level of education
(in his case, Brazil), the adoption of electronic voting clearly improves such aggregation
by enfranchising uneducated voters which frequently cast invalid votes (under the paper
ballot system). Such advantage of the electronic voting is plausibly less important in a
polity with relatively high level of literacy/education. Thus, if electronic voting is un-
likely to strongly affect the aggregation of voter preferences and the cost advantage of
machine counting is fairly small, the paper-ballot system could still be a better alterna-
tive, especially if the intensity of electoral competition is fairly high in many districts. If,
contrarily, most parliamentary seats are decided in lopsided elections, the electorate has
an important share of low-education voters, and the cost advantage of the DRE system
is large, abandoning the paper-ballot system would be a welfare improvement.
Our findings suggest an interesting future research direction. As discussed in the in-
troduction, in the last several decades numerous countries implemented reforms in their
voting technologies. Moreover, in some countries (for example, the United States) such
reforms occurred gradually and at varying speed within the country. Our theory predicts
that the correlation between the closeness of electoral race and the share of invalid bal-
lots should be present in hand-counted paper-ballot systems but not in machine-counted
ones. Thus, using an electoral district-level panel (with several countries or across the
United States), one can test whether (i) this difference in correlation exists across coun-
tries/systems, and (ii) whether the switch from paper-ballot to machine-counting system
leads to the disappearance of such correlation. Such analysis would contribute to verifying
the applicability of the theory developed in this paper to other settings and polities.
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Figure 1: Invalid ballots (as a fraction of total ballots) in the parliamentary elections
around the world
Source: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (www.idea.int)
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Figure 2: A typical ballot in Italian parliamentary elections
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Figure 3: Invalid ballots (as a fraction of total ballots) in Italian parliamentary elections,
1994-2001 (majoritarian districts)
Notes: Author’s calculation based on Italian national elections data (Corbetta and Piretti, 2008).
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Invalid ballots 0.039 0.022 0 0.573 23019
Blank ballots 0.046 0.022 0 0.245 23019
Turnout 0.820 0.108 0.049 1 23019
Leading margin at electoral unit level 0.184 0.148 0 0.961 23019
Leading margin at district level 0.139 0.124 0 0.756 23019
Right coalition leads 0.38 0.485 0 1 23019
Left coalition leads 0.362 0.481 0 1 23019
Incumbent party leads 0.945 0.229 0 1 14965
Incumbent leads 0.264 0.441 0 1 14965
Number of candidates 4.136 1.005 2 9 23019
Corruption Crime Rate (per 100 inh.) 0.001 0.007 0 0.239 23019
Organized Crime Rate (per 100 inh.) 0.007 0.012 0 0.21 23019
Dissolution of a city council between 1999-2009 0.017 0.13 0 1 23019
Fraction of pop. with university degree 0.067 0.009 0.044 0.094 22979
Fraction of pop. with high school degree 0.3 0.027 0.257 0.392 22979
Turnout at national referenda 0.684 0.086 0.48 0.811 22979
Labor activity rate 0.487 0.04 0.355 0.581 22979
Unemployment rate 0.093 0.077 0.017 0.305 22979
GDP per capita (in e10,000) 1.897 0.464 1.028 3.028 22979
Rate of urbanization 0.235 0.125 0.088 0.872 22979
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Table 2: Basic regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of invalid ballots
Leading margin at electoral unit level -0.0242*** -0.0181*** -0.0125*** -0.0137***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Turnout -0.0474*** -0.0042 0.0164
(0.006) (0.008) (0.091)
Blank ballots 0.2085*** 0.1457*** 0.1347***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.046)
Number of candidates -0.0006 -0.0022*** -0.0005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Corruption Crime Rate (per 100 inh.) 0.0166
(0.020)
Organized Crime Rate (per 100 inh.) -0.0251
(0.020)
Total Crime Rate (per 100 inh.) -0.0004***
(0.000)
Fraction of pop. with university degree -0.0390
(0.175)
Fraction of pop. with high school degree -0.1025**
(0.052)
Turnout at national referenda -0.0358**
(0.016)
Labor activity rate -0.0500*
(0.027)
Unemployment rate 0.0607***
(0.016)
GDP per capita (in 10,000) 0.0007
(0.002)
Rate of urbanization 0.0119**
(0.005)
Year FE
√
Electoral Unit FE
√
Observations 23,019 23,019 22,979 23,019
R-squared 0.028 0.158 0.263 0.702
NOTE.– Standard errors, clustered at the district level, are reported in parentheses (there are 465
majoritarian districts). There are 8,042 electoral-unit fixed effects. *,**, and *** denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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Table 3: Basic regression results for electoral units with less than 1,200 eligible voters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of invalid ballots
Leading margin at electoral unit level -0.0177*** -0.0138*** -0.0122*** -0.0095***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Turnout -0.0312*** -0.0074 -0.0397*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.021)
Blank ballots 0.1653*** 0.1453*** 0.1321***
(0.022) (0.019) (0.027)
Number of candidates -0.0006 -0.0020*** -0.0007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Corruption Crime Rate (per 100 inh.) -0.0135
(0.019)
Organized Crime Rate (per 100 inh.) -0.0532**
(0.024)
Total Crime Rate (per 100 inh.) -0.0002
(0.000)
Fraction of pop. with university degree -0.1971
(0.247)
Fraction of pop. with high school degree -0.0468
(0.077)
Turnout at national referenda -0.0441**
(0.022)
Labor activity rate 0.0196
(0.042)
Unemployment rate 0.0483**
(0.021)
GDP per capita (in 10,000) 0.0016
(0.005)
Rate of urbanization 0.0141**
(0.007)
Year FE
√
Electoral Unit FE
√
Observations 7,275 7,275 7,272 7,275
R-squared 0.017 0.085 0.147 0.689
NOTE.– Standard errors, clustered at the district level, are reported in parentheses (there are 465
majoritarian districts). There are 2,607 electoral-unit fixed effects. *,**, and *** denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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Table 5: Invalid ballots and competition at electoral-unit and district levels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of invalid votes
Whole Sample Less than 1200 Voters
Leading margin at electoral unit level -0.0094*** -0.0083*** -0.0059** -0.0048
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Leading margin of candidate -0.0098* -0.0061 -0.0107* -0.0077
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Interaction between the margins -0.0554*** -0.0432***
(0.016) (0.016)
Turnout 0.0188 0.0202 -0.0402* -0.0389*
(0.091) (0.091) (0.020) (0.021)
Blank ballots 0.1318*** 0.1291*** 0.1300*** 0.1262***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.027) (0.027)
Number of candidates -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0010
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Right coalition leads -0.0047*** -0.0043*** -0.0051*** -0.0049***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Left coalition leads -0.0016 -0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0010
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Electoral Unit and Year FE
√ √ √ √
Observations 23,019 23,019 7,275 7,275
R-squared 0.706 0.707 0.693 0.694
NOTE.– Standard errors, clustered at the district level, are reported in parentheses (there are 465
majoritarian districts). *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. There
are 8,042 electoral-unit fixed effects.
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